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Abstract 
Given the increasing consolidation in the U.S. meat 
industry, smaller and specialty producers often 
have difficulty breaking into the market in profit-
able volumes. This paper examines three coopera-
tive models for specialty beef producers. We offer 
a realistic examination of the potential for success 
of each model. Based on this, we identify the key 
attributes for a new model and offer guidance for 
future research efforts. 
Keywords 
beef producers, small-scale producers, specialty 
producers, market models 
Introduction 
In the U.S., consolidation in the meat industry has 
increased at a rapid pace. The number of major 
slaughter plants has declined rapidly. In 1997, the 
top four firms accounted for 40.6% of poultry 
slaughter and processing (Ollinger, Nguyen, 
Blayney, Chambers, & Nelson, 2005). In 20041 the 
top four firms accounted for approximately 64% of 
hog processing, and 80% of steer & heifer pro-
cessing (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2005). 
Today, the beef processing industry is classified by 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) as highly con-
centrated.2 This high concentration is further 
exemplified by a 2008 DOJ lawsuit to block the 
acquisition of National Beef Packing by JBS SA on 
antitrust grounds (Zippay, 2008).  
With this consolidation of the meat processing 
industry, there has also been a strong move toward 
the practice of supply chains which are defined by 
Barkema, Drabenstott, and Novack as “tightly 
                                                 
1 Note that these were most recent years for which we could 
find USDA data. 
2 The DOJ defines “highly concentrated” as having a 
Herfendahl Hirschman Index (HHI) of higher than 1,800 
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2009). The HHI is calculated by 
squaring the market share of competing firms and then 
summing the resulting numbers. According to a 2008 study by 
the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, the beef 
industry has an HHI of 1,826 when looking at federally 
inspected slaughter data (Anderson & Hudson, 2008). 
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orchestrated production, processing, and marketing 
arrangements stretching from genetics to grocery” 
(2001, p. 36). The first meat industry to incorporate 
supply chain methods was poultry, which led to a 
surge in its share of the meat market with its mar-
ket share gains coming from beef. Following the 
poultry industry’s lead, the pork industry also 
began to incorporate supply chain strategies into its 
processes (Barkema et al., 2001). The beef industry, 
with its longer supply chain and traditionally more 
independent producers, has lagged behind both the 
pork and poultry industries in its supply chain inte-
gration.  
Consolidation and coordination of the meat supply 
chain has in many ways been beneficial to the meat 
industry. However, small producers have not 
always benefited from these changes. The food 
industry has seen consolidation, integration, and 
coordination in the pursuit of economies of scale 
and scope, and lower transaction costs. Increased 
processor consolidation and the resulting market 
power effects have caused distributional income 
losses to all food producers (Sexton, 2000).   
One option for small beef producers in response to 
the drive for consolidation and coordination is to 
form cooperatives to achieve effective scale and 
market power. In this paper we present three 
cooperative models, with the goal of creating a new 
model for small producers seeking to access vol-
ume markets. We also examine the attributes of 
each model.  
Methodology  
The case studies include three beef cooperatives 
that have pursued very different strategies that 
allow small beef producers to access volume beef 
markets. Of these three cooperatives, two are cur-
rently successful and one is no longer in business. 
Comments by Dick Bradbury, founding member 
of Country Natural Beef, and Mike Lorentz, owner 
of Lorentz Meats, are used to illustrate some of the 
concepts discussed.  
The following attributes are used to analyze each 
case study. We define them here, use them during 
the discussion of each case study, and then review 
them in the discussion section to glean how the 
attributes form successful models. 
Marketing Management Expertise: The ability 
of smaller producers to access volume markets 
clearly depends on the marketing expertise of the 
producers. This factor is of such importance that 
the Leopold Center at Iowa State University has 
created a specific stream of research, the Marketing 
and Food Systems Initiative (Leopold Center, n.d.), 
to investigate this issue.  
Value System Coordination: In any supply chain, 
the ability of the supply chain partners to com-
municate and coordinate with each other is critical 
to superior chain performance. This has been spe-
cifically studied in the food industry (Stank, Crum, 
& Arango, 1999). In general, chain coordination 
and how to achieve it have been popular topics in 
research. For just a few examples of this research, 
see Cousins, Handfield, Lawson, and Petersen 
(2006) and Holweg and Pil (2008). Weaver (2008) 
specifically argues that “collaboration across enter-
prises” is a key for successful value networks. 
Scale: Maintaining the proper scale is a challenge 
for the smaller producer, as it must produce 
enough to interest buyers, but must to balance this 
against having enough capital (Born, 2001).  
Valued-Added Traits: One way for small produc-
ers to differentiate themselves in a commodity 
market is to offer value-added traits such as organic 
production. (See Lau, Beverly, Kelley, & Hanagriff 
(2007) for a discussion.) Some producers and 
cooperatives strive to create a “story” for consum-
ers based on value-added traits. Dimra and Skuras 
(2003) discussed how “cues” such as certification 
and geographic association signal characteristics 
and properties of the product. Franks (2003) dis-
cusses the idea of “telling the organic story” to 
consumers. The literature thus clearly indicates that 
offering value-added traits may drive consumer 
interest.  
Production System: The signal used to start pro-
duction is a key differentiator in production system 
design. The usual classifications for these signals 
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are “push” and “pull.” The former refers to a sys-
tem that produces based on a forecast and ends up 
pushing inventory down the chain. The latter sys-
tem produces when a customer order is received 
(Krajewski & Ritzman, 2002). Weaver (2008) 
argues that “push innovation” is being supplanted 
by “pull innovation,” and uses the food industry as 
an illustration. He also notes the importance of 
collaboration to pull innovation and that pull inno-
vation has been specifically used in the case of 
organic foods. This implies that of the attributes 
described, the more of them in place, the greater 
the chance for success.  
Relationship with the End Customer: The final 
attribute considered is the cooperative’s relation-
ship with the end customer. The discussion of the 
attributes of production system and value system 
coordination indicates that the cooperative needs 
to have a good understanding of its customer base. 
Nitschke and O’Keefe (1997) specifically mention 
the importance of “establishing and maintaining 
direct relationships with key customers” in their 
study of Australian grain farmers. This was seen as 
a way to provide market signals back to the pro-
ducers. Our literature review indicated that there 
has been relatively little research interest in the 
issue of agriculture cooperatives’ efforts with 
regard to customer relationships, despite the rather 
voluminous research literature on relationship 
marketing and customer relationship management 
(see Das (2009) and Kim and Kim (2009) respec-
tively for extensive literature reviews of these 
concepts).  
From Commodity to Integrated Value 
System: U.S. Premium Beef Ltd.  
U.S. Premium Beef Ltd. (USPB) is a closed, 
member-owned cooperative and is “designed to 
operate in the highly competitive, and fragmented, 
global agribusiness industry” (Katz & Boland, 
2000, p. 711). A closed, member-owned coopera-
tive is defined by van Bekkum (2001) as a coopera-
tive in which new entry is subject to the purchase 
of member rights. This is opposed to an open or 
collective cooperative structure, where entry is free. 
USPB was formed in 1996 as a reaction to two 
major difficulties in the beef market for cattle pro-
ducers. First, the integrated poultry industry began 
to gain market share in the meat industry, mainly at 
the expense of beef. Additionally, there were large 
influxes of foreign beef into the U.S. domestic 
market, which was causing downward pressure on 
pricing.  
One major problem identified by the cooperative 
founders was that, depending on market circum-
stances, each stage in the value system was put 
under stress, while another member in the value 
system was reaping the benefits. For example, 
when beef prices increased, feedlot owners bene-
fited because they were marketing finished animals 
(Katz & Boland, 2000). On the other hand, as beef 
prices decreased, the slaughter plants reaped the 
benefits, as producers were forced to sell at low 
prices.  
The term “value system” comes from Michael 
Porter’s value chain concept, where inputs pass 
through stages in a firm’s production process to 
create a new value-added product. The value sys-
tem is defined by Porter as an interconnected sys-
tem of value chains (Porter 1985). For the beef 
industry, the value system would include the seed 
stock, cow calf, back-grounding (a system where 
weaned calves are grazed before being sent to the 
feedlot), feedlot, slaughter, processing, and retail 
segments. 
Taking its cue from the pork and poultry indus-
tries, USPB sought to develop a system that 
increased coordination and communication 
throughout the value system. Unlike the pork and 
poultry industries, it wanted to create a system 
where risks and rewards were shared more equita-
bly at each stage. This process was accomplished 
through several actions. First, it incorporated each 
stage of the cattle production process into the co-
operative. Therefore, each stage of the value sys-
tem was included in the membership. Producers 
are required to buy a share for each head of cattle 
they have in the system. Shares for one member 
can range from 100 to 100,000 (Katz & Boland, 
2000). However, regardless of the number of 
shares, there is only one vote per member in the 
cooperative. Feedlot owners with 100,000 head of 
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cattle in the program do not have more voting 
power than a small cow calf producer with 100 
head in the program. 
Acquiring processing facilities is a major part of 
USPB’s strategy for sharing risk and reward more 
equitably through the value system. USPB man-
agement knew that building a large slaughter and 
processing plant would not be viable, due to high 
fixed costs and investment. Instead, they chose to 
partner with a large slaughterhouse owned by 
Farmland National, which was a producer-
cooperative–owned enterprise (a cooperative 
owned by actual cattle producers). This was attrac-
tive because it meant that the Farmland system was 
already familiar with dealing with cooperatives. As 
part of its partnership, USPB required an equity 
ownership interest in Farmland in order to main-
tain control over its ideas and to protect its share-
holders. This was attractive to Farmland as they 
were operating with excess capacity. At the start, 
USPB had the ability to make annual delivery 
commitments of 835,000 head of cattle for pro-
cessing (Katz & Boland, 2000).  
Processors often grade cattle carcasses on a grid to 
quantify carcass quality. The grid is determined by 
USPB management.3 Producers are able to earn 
“grid premiums” if their carcasses achieve charac-
teristics considered higher quality. One advantage 
that USPB has been able to incorporate through its 
structures is providing feedback on carcass quality 
to producers. In a nonvertically integrated system, 
producers are often not informed of the short-
comings of their cattle. In an effort to market 
higher quality beef, USPB has been able to inform 
producers why their cattle are not able to receive 
grid premiums. This has helped producers better 
understand the needs of the market and adopt 
management practices to better deliver those prod-
ucts — and in the process to collect grid 
premiums.  
USPB is an example of successfully integrating a 
value system that is more complicated (i.e., that has 
                                                 
3 For a description of the grading process, see the USPB 
website: http://www.uspremiumbeef.com/FAQ.aspx 
more stages and less consolidation of producers) 
than both the poultry and pork industries. USPB 
was able to attain significant scale and shows how 
smaller producers can partner with larger feedlot 
and slaughter systems to create a value chain that 
allows them increased control and participation in 
the value system.  
The key attributes for this model are a mix of 
proper scale and system coordination. These are 
exemplified by USPB deciding to partner with 
Farmland National and incorporating each stage of 
the cattle production process into the cooperative. 
To a lesser extent, it focused on value-added traits 
like U.S.-raised, and there was little push to 
develop direct relationships or contact with 
consumers.  
We should note that USPB converted to a limited 
liability company (LLC) in 2004. There are two 
share classes. “A” shares “carry delivery rights and 
obligations like USPB shares did under the cooper-
ative structure” (USPB, 2011a, para. 10) and “B” 
shares are for investors and have no delivery rights. 
The “A” shares thus look much like the previous 
cooperative structure. In fact, USPB describes itself 
as producer-owned (USPB, 2011b).  
In 2008, USPB paid record cash distributions 
(USPB, 2009). This is in contrast to Farmland 
National’s continued struggle with beef packing 
industry overcapacity and struggles to attain profit-
ability (Anderson & Hudson, 2008). Moody’s 
downgraded Farmland National’s credit rating in 
2008 due to processing industry losses in 2007 and 
2008. This performance comparison is further 
highlighted by USPB’s blocked attempt to sell 
Farmland National to JBS Swift & Co. in 2008 
(Wilke & Etter, 2008).  
Figure 1 illustrates USPB’s pursuit of value system 
coordination and scale to successfully provide 
access to volume markets for small producers. 
Notice that pull production systems and end 
consumer relationships are not included in this 
illustration. Additionally, value-added traits are 
included only to a lesser degree.  
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Challenges of Scale: Tallgrass Prairie 
Producers Co-op 
Many studies show that consumers are hypotheti-
cally willing to pay premium prices for value-added 
traits (McCluskey, Wahl, Li, & Wandschneider, 
2005), but clearly there is a difference between 
hypothetical willingness to pay and actually paying. 
The Tallgrass Prairie Producers Co-op (Tallgrass) 
was started in 1995 and continued until it was 
liquidated in 2000 due to unprofitability (Wilson, 
2001). The cooperative was originally formed to 
produce beef that was raised with sustainable val-
ues such as the conservation of natural resources, 
humane treatment of animals, no use of farm 
chemicals, and low use of fossil fuels.  
However, the cooperative was never able to reach 
profitability and only survived based on the sub-
stantial subsidization provided by cooperative 
members’ free labor. According to Wilson’s analy-
sis of Tallgrass, the fundamentals of developing a 
successful meat business based on social values 
were professional management of the business, 
sufficient volume to reach the break-even point, 
cost-effective operations, and realistic product 
pricing. These four aspects also had to be coupled 
with “a critical mass of supply and capital” (Wilson, 
2001, p. 4). In order to reach the break-even point, 
Tallgrass desperately needed a 
distributor or retailer that could 
buy in volume. However, due to 
the seasonal nature of its grass 
finishing process, there was no 
way to guarantee a steady supply 
of beef through the winter. The 
issue of supply was compounded 
by its marketing campaign, which 
especially emphasized its special 
attributes of sustainability, low 
fossil fuel usage, humane treat-
ment, no on-farm chemicals, and 
health benefits. These value-
added traits were realized through 
their grass finishing process, 
which most consumers did not 
understand. For capital, the 
cooperative initially took a “do-it-
yourself” approach to avoid debt. 
However, in the end, it did not have the capital 
needed to hire the skilled meat-industry 
professionals who could have identified and helped 
it capitalize on early market opportunities (Wilson, 
2001).  
Overall, Tallgrass was never able to develop the 
steady product flows and volume to make such 
investment in its business feasible. Barriers, or as 
Wilson stated, the “Catch-22,” in its business were 
the competing problems at each stage of its value 
chain (2001). First, in actual production they could 
only produce finished beef during the spring, 
summer, and fall months because of their grass 
finishing process. Tallgrass co-operators also over-
estimated consumers’ understanding of their pro-
cess, social values, and willingness to pay a pre-
mium for these attributes. Wilson explains that 
reaching needed production volumes would have 
been a disaster because they could never have ful-
filled such demand (2001). Second, finding a pro-
cessing facility to process the beef at the costs 
needed to be profitable was also impossible. Large 
processing facilities need sufficient volume or are 
unwilling to deal with smaller producers. Further-
more, sufficient volume is needed to build distrib-
utor business. In the end, Tallgrass found itself 
with a low-volume, high-transaction-cost produc-
Figure 1. U.S. Premium Beef Model 
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tion and distribution process that 
left them unable to provide 
consistent supply throughout the 
year. Tallgrass created a business 
that needed volume to survive 
but was never able to properly 
balance scale and marketing 
management expertise with 
value-added traits and end 
consumer relationship attributes 
to actually attain the volume it 
needed.  
Tallgrass relied heavily on the 
attribute of value-added traits for 
its model. It also emphasized the 
attribute of end-customer relationship. However, it 
did not expend enough energy to determine the 
correct the scale attribute, which led to problems 
with the attribute of value system coordination. 
This is depicted in figure 2. This ultimately led to 
the cooperative’s failure. 
From Commodity to Shinrai: 
Country Natural Beef  
First started in 1987 in response to low beef prices, 
Country Natural Beef (CNB) is a successful coop-
erative that has developed what Dan Campbell, 
editor of the USDA publication Rural Cooperatives, 
calls the “third way” of cooperative management 
(Campbell, 2006). One of the first things to note 
about the CNB cooperative is that it has almost no 
overhead and there are no equity positions for 
members. Capital requirements are raised from 
revenue derived from cattle sales. The cooperative 
owns no processing plants or feedlots, has no 
headquarters, and hires no employees. Manage-
ment functions are taken care of by “internal part-
ners” who hire their own people to perform the 
functions that require expertise (Stevenson, 2009). 
The costs of these functions are paid to the indi-
vidual rancher or “internal partner,” but these indi-
viduals are not on the official cooperative payroll. 
Feedlot functions are managed by cooperative 
members, but also are not owned by the coopera-
tive itself. Illustrative of CNB’s success is its 
growth from an organization slaughtering 3,000 
head of beef per year in 1990, to an organization 
that slaughters 47,000 head of beef today 
(Bradbury, 2009).  
This model is different from USPB. One model for 
cooperatives looking to return more dollars to 
producers is to pursue greater vertical integration. 
USPB is a prime example of this; it looked for 
controlling interests in processing facilities 
upstream in the value system in order to capture 
more of the food dollar. What CNB did was 
counterintuitive to classic cooperative expansion. 
One general problem in agricultural industries is 
the increasing level of capital needed to be com-
petitive. This is exhibited by USPB’s need to gain a 
majority stake in Farmland National. CNB has 
been able to avoid this due to its limited capital 
structure as it builds resiliency into the system. 
Activity in cattle commodity markets usually means 
that beef producers are vulnerable to volatile 
market prices that change weekly. A typical grain-
fed beef takes 18–20 months to get to slaughter 
weight. When a producer calves, he or she has no 
idea what price will be received when the animal is 
at market weight. As the logistics manager for 
CNB said, “We’re in the beef business, not the 
cattle business” (Stevenson, 2009). A cattle 
business is only looking to deliver cattle and is not 
connected to the feedlot, processing facilities, 
distributors, retailers, or consumers. Being in the 
beef business means partnering with each stage on 
the value system to create situations with mutual 
reward or shinrai. CNB’s first major customer, a 
Figure 2. Tallgrass Prairie Producers Cooperative Model 
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Japanese beef company, introduced the co-
operators to the concept of shinrai, which is the 
Japanese concept of mutual reward and mutual 
gain. CNB cultivates these relationships and also 
maintains direct contact with customers at retail 
establishments. Each CNB member is required to 
visit retail establishments three times a year to build 
relationships with both consumers and ground-
level employees of retailers. An example of culti-
vating close relationships is highlighted in the fol-
lowing story regarding CNB’s relationship to its 
processor, AB Foods, as related by Dick Bradbury 
(2009), a founding member of CNB:  
Several years back, our processor got into 
trouble and was forced to shut down for a 
few days until things could be smoothed 
over. During this time, they had a large 
order for the U.S. Army coming up. With 
the plant down and the timing of the 
order, AB [Foods] wasn’t able to fill the 
order in time. We told AB they could use 
our beef that they had on hand at the 
lower price they needed in order to fill the 
order. They couldn’t believe it. We worked 
it out with them that our cattle would be 
the first ones processed after they came 
back online. They filled their order and our 
customers didn’t experience so much as a 
hiccup. 
For CNB, AB Foods’ innovative expertise helped 
to manage carcass utilization, an extremely 
important aspect of beef marketing. It also gave 
CNB the ability to track point of origin through its 
processes. The willingness to sell excess CNB 
product through its commodity channels has made 
AB Foods a tightly knit and noninterchangeable 
partner with CNB. 
This partnership also goes into CNB’s supply fore-
casting. It communicates with both its secondary 
processor (Fulton Meats) and its major retail part-
ners. This communication allows its value chain to 
match supply with demand. Because demand is 
forecasted 18 months out, ranchers with CNB 
don’t produce calves that don’t have buyers. This, 
in essence, establishes a system that comes close to 
pull production for CNB. It is not producing as 
much beef as possible and selling it on the spot 
market. It is adding intentionality to its production 
based on its own and its partner’s expectations of 
demand. As Dick Bradbury says, “Every animal I 
produce is already sold” (2009). It should be noted 
that achieving true pull production in beef may be 
difficult given the difference between end customer 
lead time and production lead time. 
This more pull-like method of production repre-
sents a departure from other commodity beef pro-
duction and processing models. CNB is concen-
trating both on maintaining sufficient scale and 
maintaining involvement in every stage of the 
value-added process, which allows it to eliminate 
waste from overproduction. Additionally, CNB has 
been able to combine low capital expenditure with 
profitability. Low overhead means that difficult 
economic conditions and lowered demand for 
CNB products can lead to adjusted production 
targets. CNB is able to cut down on production 
and is not required to maintain fixed production 
targets or face losses. Cuts are determined by the 
cooperative, but farms can move beef through 
other channels when CNB demand decreases. The 
shinrai philosophy can be tested when the coopera-
tive loses customers. However, the low-capital 
nature of the cooperative allows it the flexibility to 
survive difficult periods. 
Though CNB uses sustainable production meth-
ods, it is not certified organic. CNB beef carcasses 
have attributes that include grass-fed, with only 
short times on the feedlot (short fed), antibiotic 
free, and humanely raised. Though its story clearly 
includes environmentally friendly concepts, it has 
not overemphasized this attribute of its model.  
While these methods have worked well for CNB, 
they do come with disadvantages, risks, and 
assumptions. First, one of CNB’s major customers, 
accounting for 60% of sales, is Whole Foods 
Market (Campbell, 2006). The relationship with 
Whole Foods Market has grown from a handshake 
agreement to formal contracts. There is significant 
overlap in CNB’s business model (story) and 
Whole Foods Market’s customer base (Stevenson, 
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2009). However, with one customer taking 60% of 
the production, there is a risk to CNB that Whole 
Foods business would have a disproportionately 
negative effect on CNB business. This actually 
happened when Whole Foods changed from a 
regional to a centralized buying structure. This hurt 
the regional relationships that had already been 
cultivated and maintained over a long period of 
time. CNB production was set up to deliver beef to 
Whole Foods operations west of the Rocky Moun-
tains. At the time of the changeover, Whole Foods 
had been growing rapidly and was looking for beef 
suppliers that would be able to deliver product to 
their locations nationally. Eventually, the relation-
ship was repaired, but this does highlight risks 
associated with dependence on one large customer.  
Furthermore, Whole Foods is able to connect 
CNB with consumers who are willing to pay more 
for direct contact with producers, environmental 
stewardship, social values, and antibiotic- and 
hormone-free production methods. There are a 
limited number of retailers similar to Whole Foods 
in the market. It might not be possible for every 
producer to connect with a retail and distribution 
system that has access to such markets. Addition-
ally, pull systems of production require high 
amounts of coordination with customers and pro-
cessors. CNB must pay for its managing members’ 
and their employees’ time to cultivate these rela-
tionships. This has proved profitable for CNB 
because of its access to premium markets. It might 
not be profitable for organizations without access 
to premium markets to take on increased transac-
tion costs.  
CNB’s model includes achieving the proper scale, 
not just size for the sake of size. It uses a pull sys-
tem of production that is facilitated by good value 
system coordination. This coordination is likely 
one outcome of the customer relationships that 
CNB has established. It has an innovative way of 
ensuring the attribute of marketing management 
expertise. Finally, its value-added traits are not 
more than what the market is willing to buy. 
Figure 3 represents the relative balance that CNB 
has struck in accessing volume markets for their 
Figure 3. Country Natural Beef Model 
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small producers. We have placed an asterisk next to 
end-customer relationship as a way to highlight the 
fact that a significant portion of their sales comes 
from one customer, making CNB very dependent 
on that customer. 
Discussion: Toward a New Model 
These three case studies were chosen because of 
the different model each represented. Organiza-
tions using similar models might achieve different 
results than the firms presented here. However, the 
three case studies do give an indication as to the 
key attributes to consider when evaluating a 
cooperative model for smaller producers to access 
volume markets: marketing management expertise; 
value system coordination; scale; value-added 
attributes; production system design; and end-
customer relationship. Table 1 is a summary of the 
three case studies. For each, the authors offer an 
admittedly subjective rating on each attribute. It is 
consumer relationships that are vital in success. 
However, as tempting as a formula for beef 
marketing success might be, it is more important to 
recognize the highly dynamic nature of these 
attributes. Depending on the scale, different levels 
of value-added traits, expertise, relationships across 
the value system, or direct consumer contact will 
be needed. For example, as consumer contact 
increases, more marketing opportunities are 
possible with less scale due the more direct 
connections between consumer and producer. The 
discussion below will note where such interactions 
are particularly important. 
Both USPB and CNB represent, to date, successful 
cooperative enterprises that have been able to con-
nect small producers to volume markets. Yet USPB 
slaughters slightly more than eight times the beef 
that CNB does. As Dick Bradbury from CNB has 
stated, “We aren’t even a drop in the bucket of the 
beef market” (2009). On the other hand, Tallgrass 
was never able to reach the scale needed to access 
volume markets and attain profitability. Scale, it 
seems, at least to a certain point, is important. A 
small producer might be able to sell 100–200 head 
of beef directly to consumers. However, as the 
number of beef marketed increases, small produc-
ers often have insufficient scale to hire a marketing 
manager full time, yet cannot market enough beef 
part time to enter into volume markets. Scale must 
thus be considered a “Catch-22” attribute.  
Marketing management expertise is clearly an im-
portant attribute for beef producers looking to 
market their products into retail markets. As Mike 
Lorentz said, “Don’t be naïve enough to think that 
you can part-time people out of a fulltime job. 
These people wake up in the morning and all they 
think about is selling more meat” (2009). 
Tallgrass’s negative experience in niche markets is 
partially due to its failure to hire the required 
expertise. Market opportunities that “do-it-your-
Table 1. Summary of Case Studies of Cooperative Business Models for Beef Marketing 
Attribute U.S. Premium Beef 
Tallgrass Prairie 
Producers Co-op Country Natural Beef 
Marketing Management 
Expertise 
Professional, full-time 
management Not significant 
Internal partners hire 
expertise as needed 
Value System Coordination 
Emphasis on 
communication between 
value chain stages 
Poor due to seasonal 
production Shared Risk and Rewards 
Scale Sufficient to secure processing capacity 
Unable to maintain 
proper scale 
Proper, in part due to 
pull production 
Value-Added Traits Lower priority Primary attribute Appropriate to what market will bear 
Production System Push system Push system Pull system
End-Customer Relationship Not emphasized Significant attribute Customer visits required
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self” ranchers may have missed could have been 
caught by more experienced professionals. In con-
trast, USPB and CNB both hired the necessary 
expertise. USPB has an official management team, 
while individual ranchers with CNB either use their 
own expertise or hire expertise on a contract basis.  
The case studies make clear that the issue of scale 
and expertise are linked. Consider the rule of 
thumb regarding scale from an industry presenta-
tion by Mike Lorentz of Lorentz Meats. When 
considering hiring a beef marketing expert, he sug-
gests that it will take at least 1,000 head of beef to 
enter into volume retail and distribution markets 
(Lorentz, 2009). The reasoning behind this state-
ment is that accessing volume markets takes at least 
one full-time marketing and sales employee. In 
order to pay a skilled full-time employee, a roughly 
1,000-beef minimum is necessary. For direct mar-
keting at low volumes, an additional employee is 
not needed. Between 200 beef and 1,000 beef is a 
no man’s land that requires more marketing labor 
than one person can give, but also does not gener-
ate enough profit to justify hiring.  
Value-added traits such as U.S. raised, humanely 
raised, antibiotic-free, GMO-free, and grass-fed are 
all important for accessing premium prices and 
volume markets. The natural meat and poultry 
market saw a 77% growth in market share between 
2002 and 2003, and was a significant part of the 
organic food industry (Organic Trade Association, 
2004). McEachern and Schröder (2004) found that 
a significant proportion of respondents to their 
survey (76%) would prefer to buy fresh meat prod-
ucts with social values–based labeling. Thus, there 
is a market for food and fiber products that convey 
a message of value-added traits (range-fed, 
humanely raised, etc.) to consumers that go beyond 
organic standards.  
Value-added traits can help small producers and 
cooperatives succeed, but they cannot make a beef 
business. These attributes have helped CNB to be 
successful. However, the experience with CNB can 
be contrasted with USPB, which does not seek to 
compete in the beef market based on sustainable 
values and attributes, yet still has helped small beef 
producers be successful in volume markets. The 
experience of Tallgrass indicates that even though 
social values and health aspects might be impor-
tant, there is a limit on what consumers are willing 
to pay for these aspects. Tallgrass received recogni-
tion in sustainable agriculture circles from people 
who wanted to believe that its environmental 
stewardship, social values, and health benefits were 
ushering in a new age for small agricultural pro-
ducers. However, its lack of profitability shows that 
while markets based on value-added traits might be 
growing, they still must balance other factors in 
their business. The key to the value-added traits 
attribute is thus selecting a level of value-added 
traits that will sell in sufficient quantity and price to 
maintain profitability. The three cases studied here 
show three different approaches with regard to this 
attribute.  
Coordination across the value system is also 
important. However, there are several different 
methods to achieving these goals. There are, as 
CNB has shown, shinrai methods of mutual risk 
and reward that require less capital outlay, but 
more regular maintenance of the relationship. 
Across each stage of the value chain, CNB main-
tains close relationships with companies that have 
similar goals and business strategies. On the other 
hand, USPB decided that it would invest down-
stream in processing capacity in its attempt to more 
tightly orchestrate its supply chains. A major focus 
of its business is greater coordination of produc-
tion, not supply chain relationships. CNB appears 
to focus on the “soft side” issues, while USPB 
appears more focused on the technical side. 
CNB has also been able to successfully partner 
across its value chain to better match its produc-
tion to demand, thus eliminating waste. It has 
created a pull system that is unique. Most organi-
zations, USPB included, are still tied to facilities 
that require a certain level of utilization and are 
required to push product out into the market, 
creating overproduction during times of limited 
demand. Vertical integration has helped to manage 
this better, but large processing facilities still must 
process sufficient product to reap economies of 
scale. In many ways, USPB doesn’t have a lot of 
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flexibility in its production numbers because of the 
driving need to keep consolidated production 
facilities operating. These cases point out how 
system coordination and system of production are 
linked. Simply put, greater coordination allows the 
opportunity to take advantage of the benefits of 
pull production systems. 
The final attribute considered is relationships with 
end consumers. This can also be an important 
factor or a difficult burden when coordinating 
across the value system. Tallgrass, for example, was 
only able to market its beef to high-transaction-
cost, small and independent retailers. Although it 
had high degrees of direct contact with consumers, 
these high transaction costs were a barrier to prof-
itability. On the other hand, CNB employs farmer 
visits to retail establishments and restaurants that 
serve its beef, which has been a key to promoting 
customer loyalty, connection with the farmer or 
rancher, and overall success. USPB does not have a 
direct relationship with the end consumer, but has 
sufficient scale to compete effectively in commod-
ity beef sectors. The case studies all point to the 
idea that strong relationships with end customers 
facilitate system coordination and pull production 
systems.  
Conclusion 
The ability of small producers working alone to 
develop and access volume markets is limited. 
Direct marketing of products is not feasible in 
high-volume environments, as it is difficult for one 
small producer to manage both marketing and 
production aspects at sufficient volumes to be use-
ful for an increasingly consolidated retail sector. 
Because of this, cooperative enterprise has long 
been an option for small beef producers to access 
volume markets and increase market power. Coop-
eratives that represent small producers must bal-
ance several factors to be successful selling into 
retail markets, as represented in figure 4. 
The aforementioned qualities must be considered 
by small beef producers. It is also important to 
note that these qualities are dynamic parts of the 
whole business. Stronger relationships with end 
consumers might negate the need for different 
value-added traits or going to a larger scale. The 
degree to which each cooperative fulfills these 
factors is often a moving target based on the par-
ticular situation of a business. It would be benefi-
cial for small beef producers to learn from the 
experiences of Tallgrass, Country Natural Beef, and 
U.S. Premium Beef, and also understand that there 
Figure 4. A New Model for Small Producers
Accessing 
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is no one way to beef marketing success. Finding 
the sweet spot for each factor is more an art than a 
science.  
This research has synthesized three case studies 
and outlined some of the factors of success in beef 
marketing. Based on this, future research on small 
producer success in volume markets should include 
the following. 
1. Additional factors responsible for small 
producer success in volume markets. 
2. Research that highlights success factors in 
volume beef marketing using empirical 
methods. 
3. Research that highlights how pull methods 
of agricultural production can be better 
incorporated into volume beef-marketing 
schemes. 
4. Research that further investigates how 
different factors responsible for small 
producer success in volume beef markets 
interact with each other. 
Research that extends the current paper along 
these lines is likely to give important practical 
guidance to small producers.  
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